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Exemption clauses are regarded as part and parcel of most contracts, and are used by 
suppliers to ensure the efficient running of their business. It is common for suppliers of risky 
activities to include exemption clauses in their contracts. Therefore, it is submitted that if 
suppliers of risky activities are not allowed to use exemption clauses, many businesses will 
close down because they will not be able to afford insurance, and those that do decide to 
carry on will pass the cost of doing business on to consumers. In determining the 
enforceability and effectiveness of exemption clauses relating to risky activities, this 
dissertation will examine the common law position in relation to the treatment of exemption 
clauses. In terms of the common law of contract, the court will most likely uphold an 
exemption clause in favour of the principles of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda. 
This is to ensure commercial and legal certainty in contracts entered into between two parties. 
However, since the introduction of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
the courts will have regard to whether the term or contract is contrary to public policy and the 
values that underlie our constitutional democracy. This dissertation will further discuss the 
rights of consumers and the duties of suppliers in terms of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008 (CPA). The CPA has brought about greater regulation of unfair contract terms. It not 
only prohibits the use of unfair, unreasonable and unjust terms, but also requires a supplier of 
a risky facility to draw the consumer‟s attention to a term that seeks to limit the supplier‟s 
liability. Furthermore, the CPA provides for greater protection of consumer rights, and 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General introduction  
Suppliers sometimes provide services to consumers which may be regarded as rather 
dangerous. Hence, risky activities are activities in which consumers voluntarily participate 
and which expose them to some form of danger.
1
 These include activities such as amusement 
park rides, bungee jumping, deep-sea diving, and even children jumping on a trampoline.
2
 If 
something goes wrong and consumers are injured, the question arises as to who is liable for 
the damages that the consumer has suffered. In the past, service providers could rely on 
exemption clauses to avoid liability. An exemption clause is a clause that seeks to limit or 
restrict one of the contracting parties‟ liabilities in respect of loss, damages, death, injuries, 
and negligence.
3
 Such clauses are generally broadly worded; for example, they will include 
words such as: “howsoever caused”, “from whatever cause arising” and “for whatever 
reason”.4 A decided case which illustrates this is Durban’s Water Wonderland v Botha,5 
where the supplier of an amusement park activity was held not liable as the wording of the 
exemption clause excluded any liability based on negligence related to the design or 
manufacture of the ride. In this case the plaintiff and her child were injured as a result of 
being thrown from a malfunctioning jet ride.  
There are two common law principles that need to be considered when discussing exemption 
clauses. These are pacta sunt servanda and freedom of contract. Pacta sunt servanda means 
that all duties and obligations that arise in terms of the agreement must be honoured.
6
 In 
addition, freedom of contract means that parties can freely enter into a contract without 
interference from third parties
7
. It is also generally accepted that a party who has signed a 
                                                             
1
 Mckay “White adventure tourism on the Ash River, South Africa” (2014) 20(1) Journal for Physical, Health 
education, recreation and dance 53. 
2
 Moyer “Think again before letting your kid on a trampoline” (2017). 
www.slate.com/article/life/the_kids/2017/07/children (Accessed: 18 September 2017). 
3
 Stoop “The current status of enforceability of contractual exemption clauses for exclusion of liability in South 
African contract law” (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 496. 
4
 Marx and Govindjee “Revisiting the interpretation of exemption clauses: Drifter Adventures Tours cc v 
Hircock 2007(2) SA 831 (SCA)” (2007) 28(3) Obiter 625. 
5
 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA). 
6
 Mupangavanhu “Fairness a slippery concept: the common law of contract and the Consumer Protection Act 68 
of 2008” (2015) 48(1) De Jure 120; Hutchison(ed) and Pretorius (ed), Du Plessis Eiselen (ed)  Contract law of 
South Africa 2ed (2012) 21-24. 
7
 Hutchison et al Contract law of South Africa 21–24.  
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contract is bound by the exemption clause even if he has not read the contract or understood 
its importance.
8
 This is based on the rule of caveat subscriptor. In terms of the caveat 
subscriptor rule it is generally accepted that once a person signs a written contract, it is not 
easy for that person to get out of that contract or to argue that some of the terms in that 
contract do not apply to the agreement.  However, this rule is not absolute, as a person can 
argue that the exemption clause is not applicable if they can prove that they made a iustus 
error (mistake),
9
 or that the contract contains an unusual term which no reasonable person 




 The common law position pertaining to the use of exemption clauses in the law of contract 
has been amended by the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).
11
 The CPA was enacted because 
the system of consumer law in South Africa was out-dated, fragmented,
12
 and the law was 
based on principles which were contrary to the democratic system that was introduced when 
the new democratic government came into power in 1994.
13
 Ever since the introduction of the 
CPA, emphasis has shifted from freedom of contract to the fact that the contracts with 
consumers should be fair. Certain aspects of the common law relating to rights of consumers 
have been incorporated into the CPA, and certain business practices that were unregulated are 
now regulated by CPA.
14
 
The CPA contains a number of provisions that are used to control the use of exemption 
clauses; for instance, the CPA provides a distinction between a so-called “black list” and a 
“grey list” of terms.15 The so-called black list of terms refers to those terms that a service 
provider cannot use in a contract; for instance, a service provider may not contract out of 
liability for gross negligence. Suppliers are, however, still entitled to contract out of liability 
for ordinary acts of negligence.
16
 The grey list of terms refers to terms that are allowed to be 
included in a contract, but suppliers must draw the consumer‟s attention to those terms and 
                                                             
8
 Van Eeden E Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) Lexis Nexis Durban 69.  
9
 Tait and Newman “Exemption provisions and the Consumer Protection Act 68 0f 2008: some preliminary 
comments (2014) 35(3) Obiter 630.  
10
 Ibid.  
11
 Act 68 of 2008. 
12
 Woker “Why the need for consumer Protection Legislation? A look at some of the reasons behind the 




 Stoop “Background to the regulation of fairness in consumer contracts (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 191. 
15
 Naude “The consumer's „right to fair reasonable and just terms‟ under the new Consumer Protection Act in 
comparative perspective” (2009) 126 SALJ 131. 
16
 Tait and Newman (2014) Obiter 639. 
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explain the nature of the activity to the consumer.
17
 For instance, when a consumer intends to 
engage in bungee jumping, the supplier must explain to the consumer that there are serious 
risks involved. 
1.2 Purpose statement  
The purpose of this study is to analyse critically the enforceability and effectiveness of 
exemption clauses when suppliers provide services which involve activities which are 
regarded as being dangerous and which expose consumers to more risks than normal. In some 
situations, suppliers may not contract out of liability at all, whereas in other situations they 
may contract out of liability provided they comply with certain requirements as specified in 
the CPA. It is critically important for suppliers to understand how far they are entitled to go 
when it comes to including exemption clauses in their contracts, and that the old common law 
approach of simply including an exemption clause in the fine print of their contracts is no 
longer sufficient to contract out of liability, especially when dangerous activities, which 
expose consumers to more risk than usual, are involved. For the purpose of this dissertation, 
such activities are referred to as risky activities. 
1.3 Statement of problem 
Exemption clauses are commonly used by service providers to escape liability for death or 
damages that may result from injuries sustained by the consumers.
18
 Such clauses have 
become the norm in places where consumers are supposed to relax and have fun with their 
families.
19
 Clauses of this type may have significant implications for the rights of consumers; 
and consumers will often enter into contracts without being aware of such clauses or without 
being aware of what these clauses actually mean.
20
 They discover that there is an exemption 
clause only when something goes wrong. When they try to hold the supplier responsible for 
the damages that they have suffered, they discover that the exemption clause exempts the 
supplier from liability.
21
 In many instances, this then means that the consumer must bear full 
responsibility for the damages that they have suffered even in circumstances where the 
                                                             
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Stoop “The current status of the enforceability of contractual exemption clauses for the exclusion of liability 
in South African law of contract” (2008) 20 (4) SA Merc LJ 496. 
19
 Mupangavanhu“Exemption clauses and the Consumer Protection Act, 2008: An assessment of Naidoo v 
Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ)” (2014) 17(3) PELJ 1182. 
20





supplier has been negligent. In the case of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom,
22
 a hospital was 
able to avoid liability for harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the negligent conduct of 
a nurse who bound his bandages too tight and caused him to lose a toe. Similarly, in the case 
of Durban’s Water Wonderland v Botha,23 the amusement park was held not liable for the 
harm suffered by the plaintiff and her daughter, even though the cause of the accident was 
mechanical failure of an amusement park ride.  
Over the years the use of exemption clauses have been seriously criticised because they were 
usually imposed on unsuspecting consumers whose rights became significantly reduced by 
the use of exemption clauses.
24
 However, if the use of such exemption clauses is to be 
completely prohibited, this would have serious consequences for businesses and as such some 
might be compelled to close down.
25
 Hence, the cost of bearing insurance may be too 
prohibitive for a business or the risk of facing a significant claim may be too risky for a 
business, thereby deterring an entrepreneur from providing certain services.
26
 In addition, 
businesses that  have continued to operate without the use of exemption clauses  will 
probably bear the cost of insurance, which will invariably be passed on to consumers. This 
could then significantly increase the cost of certain services. Where possible the 
consequences that flow from risky activities such as bungee jumping, shark cage diving and 
even amusement parks can be shared between the consumer and supplier in order for a 
balance to be achieved between the rights of consumers and suppliers. 
27
 
1.4 Research questions 
 In order to achieve the purpose of this dissertation the following questions need to be 
considered: 
 What is the effect of the common law on agreements that are concluded between the 
supplier and the consumer? 
                                                             
22
 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
23
 Supra, note 5. 
24
 Stoop “Background to the regulation of fairness in consumer contracts” (2015) 27 SAMerc LJ, Y. 
Mupangavanhu (2014) 17(3) PELJ 1182; Afrox Healthcare BPK v Strydom (Supra 22). 
25
 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract in South Africa 7th ed (2016) 216.  
26
 Naude “The use of black and grey lists in unfair contract terms legislation in comparative perspective” (2007) 
SALJ 132. 
27
  Mupangavanhu (2015) 48(1) De Jure 117. 
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 What is the effect of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa28 on the use of 
exemption clauses?  
 What is the effect of the CPA on the use of exemption clauses in risky activities? 
 What consequences will suppliers face if the use of exemption clauses in risky 
activities is prohibited? 
 What strategies can be adopted by suppliers of risky activities to minimise the risks 
and protect themselves from massive consumer claims? 
 
1.5 Research objectives  
• To ascertain the effect of the common law principles on agreements concluded 
between consumers and suppliers. 
• To ascertain the effect of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa on the use 
of exemption clauses. 
• To ascertain the effect of the CPA on the use of exemption clauses in risky activities. 
• To ascertain the consequences that will be faced by suppliers of risky activities if 
exemption clauses are not allowed. 
1.6 Research methodology  
In order to achieve the aims and objectives of this study, I will focus on consumer law and 
contract law. This study will draw upon case law and legal arguments by various authors in 
order to assess the validity of exemption clauses when used in relation to the provision of 
services which may involve risky activities. In order to determine the validity and 
enforceability of exemption clauses in these circumstances, I will draw upon various sections 
of the CPA. Furthermore, this study will also outline the legal position pertaining to the use 
of exemption clauses in Australia (New South Wales). This jurisdiction has been chosen 
because the Australian legal system provides for the Civil Liability Act (CLA),
29
 which 
addresses some of the issues pertaining to risky activities. The Australian Act governing 
consumer law
30
 also makes special allowance for the use of an exemption clause where risky 
                                                             
28
 1996 (hereafter “the Constitution”). 
29
 Act 22 of 2002 (NSW). 
30





 Therefore, in relation to this study, it is significant to outline the 
Australian position in respect of exemption clauses used by suppliers of risky activities. 
  
                                                             
31
 Ibid, section 139A. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
THE COMMON LAW DUTY OF CARE OWED  
TO A CONSUMER BY A SUPPLIER 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to discuss the legal duty of care that is owed by a supplier to a consumer. 
In particular, the duty of care that suppliers of risky activities owe to their consumers is 
considered. It is important to note that a consumer will have to prove that the supplier failed 
to adhere to the required standard of care before that supplier can be held liable. A supplier 
will not be held liable just because the consumer has suffered some form of injury. The case 
of MV Shark Team v Tallman
32
 illustrates this. In this case a ski-boat carrying tourists on a 
shark cage diving trip, capsized at sea after being hit by a big wave. As a result, Tallman 
drowned together with three other people. The key issue before the court was whether the 
death of Tallman was caused by the negligence of the skipper.
33
 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA) found that the skipper and the company were not negligent, because the boat 
had capsized as a result of being hit by a big wave that was abnormally large. Khoza v 
Member of the Executive Council for Health and Social Development of the Gauteng 
Provincial Government
34
 is another case which illustrates this point. In this case the 
plaintiff‟s baby was born with cerebral palsy. The High Court found that the negligence of 
the nursing staff was the sole cause of the cerebral palsy suffered by the child,
35
 as the 
nursing staff and the hospital failed to recognise that the mother was experiencing problems 
from the prolonged labour and failed to conduct an emergency caesarean section.
36
 
2.2 The suppliers’ duty  
Suppliers owe their consumers a duty of care to ensure that their consumers do not suffer any 
damages when they make use of the suppliers‟ goods and services. If they breach their duty, 
consumers are entitled to hold them liable on the basis of the law of delict or they may hold 
them liable for breach of contract.
37
 From this it can be said that a supplier will not be held 
liable for any damages suffered by a consumer unless it can be shown that there was some 
                                                             
32
 [2016] ZASCA 46. 
33
 Ibid, para 10. 
34
 [2015] 2 All SA 598 (GJ). 
35
 Para 71, 77. 
36
 Para 71, 77. 
37
 Mupangavanhu (2014) 17 (3) PELJ 1186. 
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form of fault involved or some form of breach of contract. In most instances, this will mean 
that the supplier was negligent in some way or it failed to take adequate steps to prevent 
foreseeable harm from occurring. For the purposes of this discussion it is most important to 
consider the following: When can it be said that a supplier has acted negligently, and in what 
circumstances will a supplier be held liable for failing to prevent harm from occurring?
38
 
2.2.1 Negligence  
Negligence refers to “conduct which involves unreasonable risk of harm to another or the 
failure to exercise the degree of care which the circumstances demand”.39 In determining 
whether the harm suffered by the consumer was reasonably foreseeable, the court will apply 
the test for negligence as set out in the case of Kruger v Coetzee.
40
 In this case the court 
stated that liability arises if a diligens paterfamilias in the position of the supplier “would 
have foreseen the possibility of his conduct injuring another and would have taken steps to 
prevent the harm from occurring, and whether the supplier failed to take such steps”.41 
However, the true test for negligence is whether the conduct complained of falls short of the 
standard required of a reasonable person.
42
 This is illustrated in Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel,
43
 
which dealt with a gate that fell on Naidoo as a result of the hotel‟s failure to maintain the 
gate. The main issue for determination was whether Birchwood Hotel was liable for the 
bodily injuries sustained by Naidoo.
44
 Naidoo pleaded that the hotel was negligent in that it 
had failed to take adequate steps to prevent the accident from occurring by not properly 
maintaining the gate
45
 and ensuring that it was safe for public usage, and by failing to warn 
the public of the potential danger created by the state of repair of the gate.
46
 It was 
emphasised that replacing the heavy gate with a lighter gate was a preventative measure that 
could have been taken by Birchwood Hotel to prevent the accident.
47
 The court held that the 
                                                             
38
 Because of the nature of this particular discussion, it is not feasible to embark on a comprehensive discussion 
of the law of delict; therefore, only those aspects which are relevant are highlighted here. As exemption clauses 
are introduced by way of contract, the common law of contract is discussed in the next chapter.  
39Nel “Risk identification and management checklist for adventure sport operators” (2017) 
http://www.tourismtattler.com/articles/legal/adventure-tourism-legal-perspective-7/64420 (Accessed 
18 September 2017). 
40
 1966(2) SA 428 (A). The case of Chartaprops 16 v Silberman (300/07) [2008] ZASCA 115 cites Kruger v 
Coetzee 1966(2) SA 428 (A), where the court endorsed that “when setting out the test for negligence what steps 
would be reasonable will always be dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case” (see para 13). 
41
 Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) at 34. 
42
 Chartaprops 16 v Silberman (300/07) [2008] ZASCA 115 at para 13. 
43
 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ).  
44
 Nadioo v Birchwood Hotel (Supra), para 3. 
45
 Ibid, para 4. 
46
 Ibid, para 4. 
47
 Ibid, para 26. 
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property owners were liable to ensure that their property did not create undue hazards for the 
public who entered and used their premises.
48
 
The Naidoo case can be compared to the case of Klassen v Blue Lagoon Hotel and 
Conference Centre,
49
 where the court declined to follow the Naidoo decision and found that 
exemption clauses should be upheld because the parties had freely and voluntarily as adults 
entered into the contract. In this case, Klassen sued Blue Lagoon for damages suffered when 
he slipped and fell in the defendant‟s bathroom, and as a result sustained an injury to his 
ankle.
50
 The plaintiff contended that when he went to the toilet there were no signs placed on 
the floor to alert him that the floor was wet and slippery;
51
 nor was he warned by the 
receptionist that the floor was wet. The defendant disputed this claim, alleging that the 
plaintiff was drunk at the time he had signed into the hotel.
52
 The hotel relied on the 
exemption clause which read: “The hotel is not responsible for any personal injury to the 
guest whether such injuries or loss were sustained by the negligent or wrongful act of anyone 
in the employment of or acts on behalf of the defendant.” 53 The court acknowledged that 
when the defendant had checked in at reception, he had completed and signed a registration 
card, which contained an exemption clause that excluded the hotel‟s liability from harm 
suffered by the defendant.
54
 In addition, the exemption clause was mounted on the fence in 
such a manner that it was visible to a vehicle entering the premise. There was also a 
disclaimer displayed at the guard house.
55
 Evidence established that the defendant had had a 
properly functioning system in place, and that it had taken reasonable steps and precautions 
to ensure that the toilet facilities were kept in a clean and dry condition and that they did not 
pose any danger to guests. 
56
 
In order to determine whether the harm is reasonably foreseeable, the court takes into 
consideration the extent in which the occurrence of the harm should have been anticipated.
57
 
It looks not only at the possibility of the accident occurring, but also at the remoteness of 
such occurrence, the nature of the harm (serious or negligible), and whether the harm was of 
                                                             
48
 Ibid, para 24. 
49
 [2015] 2 All SA 482 (ECG). 
50
 Klassen v Blue Lagoon Hotel and Conference Centre Supra, para 1. 
51
 Ibid, para 19. 
52
 Ibid, para 20. 
53
 Ibid, para 3. 
54
 Ibid, 34. 
55
 Ibid, para 35. 
56
 Ibid, 43. 
57
 Supra, note 36, para 11. 
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such a nature that a reasonable person would have taken steps to guard against the occurrence 
of such harm.
58
 Samuels v Vuka Marketing (Pty) Ltd and Others
59
 is an example of a case 
where consumers expressly agreed to participate in a risky activity. In this case the plaintiff 
and his wife participated in a tandem swing, known as the big swing, during which their 
swing plummeted down and collided with rocks at the bottom of a gorge, resulting in severe 
injuries to the plaintiff and the death of his wife. The rope which was used when the couple 
jumped had not been secured properly by the operator. The court found that the operator had 
been grossly negligent and found him liable for the death of the deceased as he should have 
foreseen the possibility that someone would die if the rope was not tied properly. 
2.2.2 Preventing harm 
Once it has been determined that the harm that was suffered by the consumer is reasonably 
foreseeable, the court will have to determine whether in the circumstances in which the harm 
occurred the supplier could have taken steps to prevent the harm from occurring.
60
 If the 
harm that was suffered by the consumer was preventable, a supplier could be held liable for 
failing to do something when it should have been done or for doing something when it should 
have not been done.
61
 This may include:
62
 
1. Failure to post clear warning signs that sufficiently warn the consumer about the 
consequence of participating in the activity; 
2. Failure to provide regular inspections; 
3. Failure to maintain the equipment in a safe condition regularly; 
4. Failure to supervise consumers while they are engaged in the activity. 
An example of the kind of conduct which may result in a claim of negligence occurred in 
2013, when a couple went to the South African theme park and entertainment venue, Gold 
Reef City. They embarked on a ride called “The Tornado”.63 When the couple climbed onto 
the ride they noticed a number of carts had their safety bars tied to the carts with pieces of 
wire, so they decided to skip those carts and chose another one. When the park attendant 
                                                             
58
 Supra, para 11 and 48. 
59
 (23237/12) [2013] ZAGPPHC 412. 
60
 Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of delict (2016) Durban: Lexis Nexis. 
61
 Michon “Legal claims in amusement park accidents” (2017) http://www.nolo.com/legal-






 Taylor “Trauma at Gold Reef City” (2013) 
https://toritaylorswordofmouth.wordpress.com/2013/02/21/trauma-at-gold-reef-city/ (Accessed 17 June 2017). 
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came to lower their safety bar he began adjusting something next to their feet. The attendant 
pulled out a bolt, reattached the bolt, and lowered the lamp bar. About halfway into the ride 
the bolt fell off, along with two other bolts. Even though the couple were screaming that the 
bolt had fallen off, the attendant did not stop the ride. Fortunately, the ride stopped on its own 
and the couple was able to avoid death or injury. From these facts, it is apparent that the park 
attendant was aware that there were problems with the rides. If the couple had been injured, 
the park attendant would have been held liable for negligence for failing to take adequate 
steps to ensure that the ride was safe for customers. 
Another example occurred at a lodge in Krugersdorp where a woman was seriously injured in 
a bungee jumping accident.
64
 The woman leapt from an elevated point during the jump and 
the cord came loose and snapped. In this case the bungee jumping instructor had failed to 
ensure that the cord was secure enough for the jump. 
A decided case that illustrates a supplier‟s failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the 
consumer from suffering injuries is the case of Katzeff v Canal Walk Limits,
65
 where a ten-
year-old girl named Andrea Katzeff was scalped when her waist-length hair was caught in the 
rear axle of a go-kart. The court ruled that the go-kart operator had been negligent and had 
breached its duty of care, as it had failed to ensure that Andrea had adequate protective 
clothing and equipment before she had been allowed to participate in go-karting.
66
 It had also 
failed to have due regard to her long hair and what might happen if her hair should become 
entangled in an axle of the go-kart, and had failed to take adequate and reasonable steps to 
ensure that her hair did not become entangled in the axle of the go-kart.
67
  
However, where the supplier has taken all the required steps to prevent the accident from 
occurring or to ensure that the consumer is aware of the risks associated with participating in 
the activity, it cannot be said to have acted negligently and thus to have breached the duty of 
care. This was illustrated in the case of P and Another v Big Sky Trading 489 cc t/a Mike’s 
Kitchen.
68
 In this case, a restaurant provided an entertainment area for children visiting the 
restaurant with their parents. In the entertainment area there was a trampoline that children 
could jump on. A 13-year-old boy was injured while playing on the trampoline. The issue 
                                                             
64
 Erasmus  “Women injured as bungee cords snaps (2011)”http://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/woman-
injured-as-bungee-cord-snaps-20110402 (Accessed 17 June 2017). 
65
 (10293/03) [2005] ZAWCHC 58. 
66




 (5894/2013) [2015] ZAGPPHC 379 (12 June 2015). 
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before the court was whether Mike‟s Kitchen had had a legal duty to prevent injury to the 
child.  
The court found that all the possible precautions had been taken by Mike‟s Kitchen to render 
the trampoline safe. The trampoline had netting around it and the netting attached to the top 
of it was high. The testimony given by the boy showed that the area between the springs and 
the trampoline had been filled with soft sponge.
69
 Furthermore, there were steps leading to 
the entrance of the netting of the trampoline with a small entrance and one had to bend down 
to gain entrance. Two signs were attached to the front of the netting of the trampoline. One 
was a height restriction sign and the other made it clear that children could use the trampoline 
only under adult supervision. 
70
 Furthermore, rules regarding the use of the playground were 
erected at the entrance to the playground, on the climbing frames for the small children, and 
on the netting of the trampoline.
71
 Evidence also showed that the boy had exceeded the height 
limit and that he had often jumped on the trampoline without parental supervision. Evidence 
also showed that the child had often performed risky tricks on the trampoline.
72
 
The court came to the conclusion that even if there had been an adult standing right next to 
the trampoline, nothing could have prevented injury to a child executing risky tricks.
73
 He 
could have fallen on his neck or head at any moment and nobody standing close to the 
trampoline could have prevented the accident. The court concluded that it could not be stated 
that there was any legal duty on Mike‟s Kitchen to do more than what had already been 
done.
74
 Therefore the court found that Mike‟s Kitchen had not acted negligently in failing to 
prevent the accident.  
A similar case is that of Deacon v Planet Fitness Holdings (Pty) Ltd.
75
 In this case, the 
plaintiff attempted to follow her son through the drop-arm barrier at the exit of the 
defendant‟s gym. As she did so, the arm closed and hit her legs, causing her to fall.76 As a 
result, the plaintiff was injured, and sued the gym for damages. The gym relied on the 
exemption clause to avoid liability. The plaintiff argued that the gym owed her a duty of care 
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by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff attended the gym.
77
 The gym breached this duty of care 
to the plaintiff, and was negligent while acting in the course and scope of employment.
78
 In 
determining whether the defendant breached the duty of care, the court took into 
consideration that the barrier was similar to the doors of a lift or an escalator, and that people 
are all familiar with barriers and turnstiles in shops, at sport grounds, and on transportation, 
which were all designed to provide access to only one person at a time.
79
 These were normal 
and regular features of society, and therefore there was no reason why the defendant should 
have warned the plaintiff about the barrier.
80
  
Another similar case is that of Durban‟s Water Wonderland v Botha.81 In this case, the court 
held that the amusement park was not liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, because 
a person approaching the ticket office to purchase tickets could not have failed to observe the 
notice boldly painted on either side of the cashiers‟ window.  The court further held that the 
amusement park had done everything that was necessary to bring the attention of the 
respondent to the notice and, the contract was concluded subject to the terms of the notice.   
2.3 Concluding remarks  
As stated above, suppliers of any activity, including risky activities, owe their consumers a 
duty of care. When suppliers breach this duty of care because they have acted negligently or 
because they have failed to take reasonable steps to prevent harm from occurring, they will be 
held liable for their conduct. 
82
However, suppliers are entitled to contract out of liability for 
negligence, which will now be discussed in Chapter Three. Furthermore, where a supplier has 
contracted out of liability for negligence, a consumer cannot avoid the limitation by simply 
bringing a claim in delict.
83
 A consumer would have to prove that the exemption clause does 
not apply. The circumstances in which such a clause will not apply under the common law 
are discussed in Chapter Three, and Chapter Four focuses on the impact which the CPA has 
had on such clauses. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 
3.1 Introduction 
The principles of freedom of contract and sanctity of contract are based on the idea that 
parties to a contract have freedom of choice.
84
 The parties are free to decide the content of 
their agreements and once they have done so, they should be free from external 
interference.
85
 The proposition that contracts entered into freely and voluntarily should be 
enforced promotes legal and commercial certainty as it ensures that businesses are able to 
operate efficiently.
86
 When a dispute regarding the enforceability and effectiveness of an 
exemption clause in a written contract arises, the party that seeks to enforce the contract will 
usually invoke the caveat subscriptor rule to hold the other party bound to the contract.
87
 This 
rule means “let the signer beware”. To ensure reasonableness and fairness in contacts entered 
into between consumers and suppliers, the courts have endorsed the principle of public policy 
which in recent times has been linked to the Constitution. A case that outlines the basis of 
public policy and the role it plays in the law of contract in terms of the Constitution is 
Barkhuzien v Napier.
88
 In this case, the court held that in establishing whether a contract is 
constitutional or not, the court must determine whether the terms are against the principle of 
public policy weighed against the Constitution and the values that underlie it.
89
 
This chapter aims to outline the common law in relation to contract law, with particular 
reference to the use of exemption clauses. In addition, it will outline the effect of the principle 
of caveat subscriptor on agreements concluded between parties. It will further outline two 
principles that are regarded as the cornerstone of South African law of contract. These are 
“freedom of contract” and “sanctity of contract”. It will further evaluate the role that public 
policy plays when it comes to deciding whether the courts should enforce a contract or a 
particular term. Lastly, this chapter will consider the wording used in exemption clauses, and 
whether the exemption clause that the supplier seeks to rely on covers the nature of harm 
suffered by the consumer. 
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3.2 Freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda 
The principle of freedom of contract is regarded as the foundation of the South African law of 
contract and has been heavily relied upon by courts.
90
 In terms of the principle, parties are, 
within the limits of legality, free to decide whether,
91
 with whom, and on what terms to 
contract.
92
 Once parties to the contract have exercised this freedom, the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda ensures that an agreement that is voluntarily and truly entered into should be 
enforced.
93
 A major criticism of exemption clauses is that the principles of freedom of 
contract and pactum sunt servanda triumph over the right to fairness and reasonableness. This 
is because even an exemption clause that operates unfairly is likely to be regarded as 
enforceable in order to give effect to the principles of pacta sunt servanda and freedom of 
contract. As pointed out by Stoop, “any interference by the court because an agreement 
appears to be unreasonable would be a form of paternalism inconsistent with the parties‟ 




 This point was endorsed in 
the case of Brisley v Drosky.
95
Where the court held that courts will not lightly interfere with a 
party‟s right to freedom of contract.96 
3.3 Caveat subscriptor 
 
When parties sign a contract they are taken to be indicting that they intend to enter into a 
valid and binding agreement.
97
 They cannot later argue that the document does not signify 
their true intention.
98
 This principle is outlined in the case of Burger v Central South African 
Railway,
99
 where the court held that “it is sound principle of law that a man, when he signs a 
contract, is taken to be bound by the ordinary meaning and effect of the words which appear 
above the signature”. 100 
Moreover, there is no duty on one contracting party to inform the other party about the 
content of their agreement, and a person who signs a contract without reading it does so at 
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 This principle was reinforced in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom.
102
 In 
this case the court held that there is no duty on the admission clerk of a hospital to point out 
an exemption clause to a patient at the time that he is being admitted for treatment. 
A party who receives a contract is regarded as being aware of the writing and the terms and 
conditions that relate to the contract.
103
 The court in Afrox also noted that such exemption 
clauses have become the rule rather than the exception.
104
 Therefore, the patient was bound to 
the contract regardless of whether or not he read the document. This principle is based on the 
doctrine of quasi-mutual assent or the reliance theory.
105
 The inquiry is whether the other 
party is reasonably entitled to assume that by the words or conduct of the other party they 
intended to be bound by the contract.
106
 The reliance theory is illustrated in the case of Smith 
v Hughes,
107
 where the court held: 
“If whatever a man‟s real intention may be he so conducts himself that a reasonable man 
would believe that he is assenting to the terms proposed by the other party and the other party 
upon that belief enters into the contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would 
equally be bound as if he intended to agree to the other party‟s terms”.
108
 
However, there is a rebuttable presumption to the principle of caveat subscriptor, because 
signing a contractual document does not necessarily mean that a party will always be bound 
by the contract or its terms. The party can escape liability on the basis of iustus error or 
where the other party‟s reliance was not reasonable, and he was not led to believe that the 
other party was assenting to the terms of the contract.
109
 
Sometimes exemption clauses are contained in documents such as tickets or displayed notices 
in circumstances where consumers are not required to sign something. Consumers will be 
bound by the exemption clause if the supplier did everything that was reasonably necessary to 
draw the consumers‟ attention to the notice.110 The inquiry is “whether the steps taken by the 
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supplier were reasonable as to draw the attention of a reasonable consumer to the terms of the 
notice so that the supplier”,111 on the basis of the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent or reliance 
theory, is entitled to assume from the consumer‟s conduct that he has read and assented to the 
terms or is prepared to be bound by the terms without reading them.
112
 
It is a well-known fact that most consumers do not read contracts before they sign them,
113
 
nor do they read tickets that are handed to them or large notices that are displayed on walls.
114
 
However, on the basis of the reliance theory and the caveat subscriptor rule (in the case of a 




3.4 Public policy and good faith 
The principle of public policy has been recognised by courts as a mechanism to set aside a 
contract or a term in a contract.
116
 The courts have, however, emphasised that they will not 
exercise the power to declare contracts contrary to public policy too quickly.
117
 They will 
exercise such power only when it is clear that the contract is contrary to public policy in that 
it is clearly against the values of society.
118
 Before the introduction of the Constitution, 
clauses that excluded liability for negligently causing death or injury were permissible.
119
 
This was endorsed in the case of Durban’s Water Wonderland v Botha,120 where the court 
upheld an exemption clause relied on by the amusement park to avoid liability for the injury 
that was suffered by the plaintiff and her daughter. Similarly, in Afrox,
121
 the plaintiff sued a 
private hospital which also relied on an exemption clause to avoid liability. The plaintiff 
sought to challenge the validity of the exemption clause on the basis that it was not in the 
public interest, and that the admission clerk should have drawn the consumer‟s attention to 
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 The court contended that the exemption clause was not against public policy 
and was thus enforceable.
123
  
Since the introduction of the Constitution in 1996 the issue of how public policy should be 
evaluated is rooted in the Constitution and the values that underlie South Africa‟s 
constitutional democracy.
124
 Furthermore, to ascertain whether the exemption clause offends 
public policy, the values and principles that underlie South Africa‟s constitutional democracy 
must be taken into consideration,
125
 and any clause that offends any of the values enshrined in 
the Constitution is contrary to public policy and is therefore unenforceable.
126
 This was 
expressed in the case of Barkhuzien v Napier,
127
 which dealt with the constitutionality of a 
time-bar clause in a short-term insurance policy. In the majority decision, Ngcobo J defined 
public policy as follows: 
“Public policy represents the legal convictions of the community; it those values that are held 
most dear by the society. Determining the content of public policy was once fraught with 
difficulties. That is no longer the case. Since the advent of our constitutional democracy, 
public policy is now deeply rooted in our Constitution and the values that underlie it. Indeed, 
the founding provisions of our Constitution make it plain: our constitutional democracy is 
founded on, among other values, the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality 
and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, and the rule of law. And the Bill of 
Rights, as the Constitution proclaims, 'is a cornerstone' of that democracy; 'it enshrines the 




 The majority decision upheld the time bar clause as not being contrary to public policy but 
there was a strong minority decision delivered by Sachs J that is particularly relevant to this 
discussion. In his judgment, Sachs J discussed standard-form contracts that are placed before 
consumers who often sign them without reading them or understanding their true nature. This 
is something that frequently occurs when an issue around an exemption clause arises. He 
pointed out that the terms of the standard form contract tend to favour the supplier heavily 
and to operate in such a manner as to exclude and limit the consumer‟s normal contractual 
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rights and the supplier‟s normal contractual obligations and liabilities.129 Not only is the 
consumer unable to resist the terms of the contract, 
130
 but he is usually unaware of certain 
terms in the contract. If there is an exemption clause that excludes the supplier‟s liability 
from any harm that may be suffered by the consumer it is usually hidden away in “fine 
print.”131 The time and task of looking through small print in endless standard-form contracts 
is beyond the expectations of any ordinary person who simply wishes to engage in the 
services of the supplier.
132
 Sachs J was of the opinion that a clause that did not afford a 
contracting party a fair and reasonable opportunity to approach the court for judicial redress 




Also linked to the principle of public policy is the principle of good faith. The concept of 
good faith is a concept that underlies the law of contract. This suggests that when one party 
seeks to enforce a contract, he should act in good faith; and if he is acting in bad faith, the 
other person is entitled to a legal remedy. Determining the exact role of good faith in South 
African law of contract has not been easy, as South African courts have grappled with the 
issue of whether good faith can be used as a mechanism to set aside a contract. The court in 
the case of Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suiderlike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO
134
 recognised the 
close link between good faith and public policy and public interest.
135
 The court also 
recognised that the concept of good faith has always been recognised as a fundamental 
principle that underlies the law of contract and informs the principles of fairness, 
reasonableness, and equity.
136
 It recognises the doing of simple justice between two parties to 
a contract, and precludes the enforcement of a clause in a contract that goes against the 
principles of equity, fairness and reasonableness. 
137
 Many commentators felt that the concept 
of good faith would be developed by courts in such a way as to intervene in the unfair 
enforcement of a contract. Christie went so far as to state that when it comes to the 
enforcement of a contract, parties should be required to take into consideration the legitimate 
interest of the other party.
138
 However, in the case of Barkhuizen, although the court 
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recognised the importance of the principle of good faith and the link between good faith and 
public policy, the court held that good faith is not an independent basis for setting aside 
contractual provisions, but is rather a basic principle which underlies the law of contract and 
which finds expression in the specific rules and principles of contract law. Louw argues that 
the Barkhuizen case left the door of public policy open for the development of good faith in 
the common law of contract.
139
 It is submitted that by leaving the door open, the court created 
the possibility that good faith may in the future become embedded in the principle of freedom 
of contract, rather than being disregarded when it comes to deciding whether a contract term 
is unfair. 
Hopes for a future revisiting of the proper role of good faith in contract law emerged in the 
case of Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers.
140
 The court in Everfresh emphasised 
the central importance of the principle of good faith and the desirability of infusing the law of 
contract with the constitutional values, including the value of ubuntu.
141
 It is submitted that 
the court in Everfresh highlights the importance of taking into account the interests and rights 
of both parties when it come deciding whether a contract should be enforced, and how the 
principle of good faith could be used to limit the enforcement of a term or contract if 
enforcement would be unfair and unjust to any one of the parties. However, the court in 
Everfresh was not able to address the issue of good faith as a result of procedural issues. 
Therefore, the position in so far as good faith is concerned remains as stated in the 
Barkhuizen case.  
It is clear that the courts will set aside a contract only if it is contrary to public policy.
142
 
Furthermore, as stated above, courts have always stated that parties are free to enter and 
decide the terms of their contract, and even if the terms of the contract are alleged to be harsh 
and unfair to one of the contractual parties, the court will not interfere just because it appears 
to be unfair to one of the contractual parties. 
143
This is particularly significant when it comes 
to the enforcement of exemption clauses. This is because, before the parties enter into an 
agreement with one another, they agree that the clause will form part of their agreement, and 
even if it operates harshly or unfairly toward one of the contractual parties, the courts are 
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likely to give effect to it. With the introduction of the CPA, although suppliers are still 
allowed to rely on exemption clauses to protect their business, the CPA limits and prohibits 
exemption clauses that are unfair, unreasonable, and unjust.
144
 This will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
3.5 The interpretation of exemption clauses 
The general rule is that where the exemption clause is clear and unambiguous, effect must be 
given to it.
145
 The court will have to consider the wording of the exemption clause, and 
determine whether, based on the facts of a particular case, the party should be bound to the 
contract. In the case of Barnard v Protea Assurance Co Ltd t /a Protea Assurance,
146
 the 
deceased took out an insurance policy with Protea Assurance. The policy excluded the 
insurance company‟s liability from death caused by participating in “skin diving” or any 
other sport involving exceptional risk. At the time of his death, the deceased had been 
participating in a scuba diving course when he drowned. The main issue the court had to 
determine was whether the deceased at the time of death was skin diving. The court held that 
the intention of the parties had to be sought from the language of the policy.
147
 Furthermore, 
the court held that the term “skin diving” used in the policy was ambiguous and unclear, as it 
was not clear what the words meant.
148
 The court interpreted the term “skin diving” as 
requiring some type of breath-holding diving, requiring certain equipment which involved the 
use of a snorkel, and there had to be exceptional risk before it could be categorised as “skin 
diving”.149 The deceased had not been wearing a snorkel and therefore, the court held, he had 
not been skin diving. The plaintiff was therefore entitled to the benefit under the policy.  
Where the exemption clause is ambiguous and unclear, the court will adopt a narrow 
approach. The court must first determine what type of liability exists without the exemption 
clause (negligence, gross negligence, strict liability).
150
 The clause will then be applied only 
to the type of liability involving the least degree of blameworthiness. The court will therefore 
limit the exemption clause to the risks its words state.
151
 Furthermore, where there is any 
doubt, and the exemption clause is capable of having more than one meaning, the exemption 
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clause will be interpreted to favour the consumer.
152
 This is known as the contra proferentem 
rule, which requires that, where the clear meaning cannot be determined, the clause will be 
interpreted against the supplier.
153
 However, as stated above, when the wording of exemption 
is clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to it.
154
 This was illustrated in Durban‟s 
Water Wonderland v Botha (Pty) Ltd v Botha,
155
 where the court held that: 
“If the language of the disclaimer or exemption clause is such that it exempts the proferens 
from liability in express and unambiguous terms, effect must be given to that meaning. If 
there is ambiguity, the language must be construed against the proferens... But the alternative 
meaning upon which reliance is placed to demonstrate the ambiguity must be one to which 
the language is fairly susceptible, it must be not be fanciful or remote”. 
In this case the court found that it was clear from the language used in the clause that any 
liability that was based on negligence in the design or construction of the amusement park 
would fall within the ambit of the clause.
156
  
The interpretation of an exemption clause also involves determining the meaning of the 
specific words used in the grammatical construction of the sentence,
157
 and the fact or 
external objects to which the words of the exemption clause relate, in order to arrive at a 
sense of the exemption clause.
158
 Over the years the courts have given appropriate 
consideration to the proper meaning of words and phrases such as “any loss”, “any damage”, 
“howsoever caused”, “from whatever cause arising” and “for whatever reason”.159 
Mpuangavanhu submits that such words cannot be read in isolation; they must be read and 
interpreted within the context within which they operate.
160
  
In the case of Walker v Redhouse,
161
 Redhouse went riding at a guest house where she was 
staying for holiday. Before the ride, Redhouse signed a document containing a clause that 
excluded the staff from any liability arising from riding the horses. During the ride the horse 
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bolted and Redhouse was injured.
162
 The main question that the court had to decide was 
whether or not the indemnity signed by the respondent excluded liability for injuries 
sustained while horse riding.
163
 Redhouse argued that the words “any” qualifies loss or 
damages. It does not cover injuries sustained when the horse acted contra naturam because 




“I hereby confirm that neither Walkersons or [sic] Critchley Hackle, or any member of their 
staff shall be liable to me, my estate or dependants for any loss or damage sustained as a 
result of my death or injury to my person or property in the course of my horse riding about 
the property of Walkersons.” 




“The correct approach is well established. If the language of the disclaimer or exemption 
clause is such that it exempts the proferens from liability in express and unambiguous terms, 
effect must be given to that meaning. If there is ambiguity, the language must be construed 
against the proferens. (See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners & 
Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A) at 804C.) But the alternative meaning upon which 
reliance is placed to demonstrate the ambiguity must be one to which the language is fairly 
susceptible; it must not be „fanciful‟ or „remote‟”. 
The court also relied on the case of Lawrence v Kondotel Inns (Pty) Ltd,
166
 where the court 
found that the exemption clause did not exclude liability under the pauperian action where a 
horse had bolted and therefore acted contra naturam.
167
 The exclusion clause in question 
stated: “All riders ride at their own risk; if any accident should occur, Kondotel or the 
management of this hotel will not be held responsible.” The court held that what was 
expected here was the usual and normal occurrence which might happen, such as a horse 
stumbling in a pothole, or being startled by some sudden event. The clause did not cover 
misconduct on the part of the horse had it, for example, turned and bitten the rider, or bolted 
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 In Lawrence v Kondotel Inns (Pty) Ltd,
169
 where the court held that when a horse 
is ridden by a young child who cannot control it, and the child falls, is dragged, and seriously 
injured, the hotel is liable, because the risk of bolting was not contemplated by the parents. 
However, in the Redhouse case, the court distinguished the situation because the exemption 
clause in Redhouse was much more cogent and clearly covered the situation where the horse 
had acted contrary to its nature. The exemption notice clearly excluded Walker‟s liability for 
“any loss or damages sustained as a result of death or injury to [her] person or property in the 
course of horse riding”.  
3.6 Concluding remarks  
From the discussion above it is apparent that exemption clauses are frequently found in 
contracts, especially in contracts where there may be some form of risk to consumers such as 
horse riding and hospital contracts. Even in circumstances where the consumers have clearly 
not read the contracts and are not aware of the exemption clauses, the courts will generally 
under the common law uphold the exemption clause.
170
 The courts have in numerous cases 
said that they will strike down an exemption clause if it is contrary to public policy, but 
exemption clauses are regarded as part and parcel of commercial practice and so are not 
regarded as contrary to public policy. This was clearly seen in the Afrox decision. Even with 
the introduction of the Constitution, it appears that the court will uphold exemption clauses 
that are properly drawn up although it has been questioned whether an exemption clause that 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
4.1 Introduction  
The Consumer Protection Act (CPA) was introduced in April 2011 to protect consumers in 
South Africa, especially vulnerable consumers from exploitation in the market place and to 
advance their social and economic welfare.
172
 More importantly, the CPA aims, among other 
things, to establish a legal framework for the achievement and maintenance of a consumer 
market that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable and responsible, for the benefit of 
consumers generally;
173
 to promote fair business market practices,
174
 and to protect 
consumers from unconscionable, unjust and unreasonable business practices.
175
 It applies to 
transactions that are concluded in the ordinary course of business, within South Africa, as 
well as to the supply of goods and services.
176
 Since its introduction, the CPA has had a 
profound impact on the manner in which business operates in South Africa. It aims to ensure 
that suppliers conduct their business in an honest, legal and ethical manner by not only 
prohibiting unfair, unreasonable and unjust contractual provisions, but by also requiring 
suppliers to draw consumers attention to the fact, nature and potential effect of an exemption 
clause that limits their liability for personal injury or death. This aspect of the CPA is 
particularly relevant to suppliers of risky services. There are a number of sections of the CPA 
that such suppliers need to take note of. These include the following: 
 The need for plain language;177 
 Terms must be fair, reasonable and just;178 
 There must be adequate notice of risk; 179 and  
 Suppliers are liable for damage caused by the supply of defective goods.180 
 
                                                             
172
Act 68 of 2008, Section 3. 
173
 Ibid, section 3(1)(a). 
174
Ibid, section 3(1)(c). 
175
 Ibid, section 3(1)(d). 
176
 Ibid, section 5(1)(a). 
177
 Ibid, section 22. 
178
Ibid, section 48. 
179
 Ibid, section 49. 
180
Ibid, section 61. 
26 
 
4.2 Plain language  
The CPA requires that all notices must be displayed or produced in plain language.
181
 Plain 
language is defined in terms of the CPA, as “language that enables an ordinary consumer for 
whom a notice or document is intended, with average skills and minimal experience as a 
consumer, to understand the content without undue effort”.182 In order to determine whether 
the document is in plain language the following factors must be taken into consideration:
183
 
 The context, comprehensiveness and consistency of the notice, document or visual 
representation;  
 The organisation, form and style of the notice, document or visual representation; 
 The vocabulary, usage and sentence structure of the notice, document or visual 
representation; 
 The use of any illustrations, examples, headings, or other aids to reading and 
understanding. 
The CPA does not, however, stipulate that the provision must be in a person‟s official 
language, because to do so would place an undue burden on suppliers.
184
 Stadler points out 
that writing in plain language does not mean that the language must be simple or that the 
provisions of the exemption clause must be reduced, as information may be complex in 
nature.
185
 All that is required is that the exemption clause must be understandable and 
transparent and as reader friendly as possible.
186
 It is not the information that is simplified but 
the language.
187
 However, despite the introduction of section 22, there are still contracts that 
are written in obscure and incomprehensible language. The reason why most contracts are 
written in obscure language is to allow suppliers to take advantage of the consumer‟s inability 
to understand the contract.
188
 Furthermore, the plain language requirement in the CPA is 
unrealistic as most of these contracts are drafted by attorneys who are not trained to identify 
and understand target audiences in the way that information designers are.
189
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If the requirement of plain language is met in terms of the CPA, consumers will be able to 
make an informed decision regarding whether they want to participate in the risky activity. 
This would also be in line with the preamble of the CPA, which provides that the aim of the 
right to plain language is “to improve access to, and the quality of, information that is 
necessary so that consumers are able to make informed choices according to their individual 
needs”.190 
4.3 Fair, reasonable and just terms and conditions 
Section 48 prohibits the use of unfair, unreasonable or unjust terms or conditions in consumer 
agreements.
191
 This is further amplified in section 48(2)(b), which provides a list of instances 
when a term in an agreement will be regarded as being unfair. For example, a contractual 
term will be regarded as being unfair, unreasonable or unjust if: 
 It is excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than the consumer or other 
person to whom goods or services are supplied;
192
 or 
 The terms of the agreement are so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable.193 
It is submitted that an exemption clause that excludes the supplier‟s liability when the 
consumer was taking part in an activity that could not be regarded as being dangerous is 
regarded as being unfair, unreasonable, and unjust in terms of section 48.
194
 Moreover, 
section 48(1)(c) provides that “a provision that requires a consumer to waive any rights, 
assume any obligation, and waive any liability of the supplier will be regarded as unfair, 
unreasonable and unjust”.195 It may well be argued that an exemption clause constitutes a 
waiver of the consumer rights as it prevents the consumer‟s right to access the court for 
judicial redress when they have suffered injuries as a result of the negligence of a supplier.  
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 4.4 Regulation 44 
 In addition to the sections in the CPA which deal with unfair terms, regulation 44 of the CPA 
contains a list of terms that are presumed to be unfair, unreasonable, and unjust in terms of 
section 48. This is commonly referred to as the “grey” list of terms. In terms of regulation 
44(3)(a),
196
 terms in a consumer agreement that excludes the supplier liability for death or 
personal injury are presumed to be unfair. This means a supplier wanting to exclude liability 
for death or injury will have to persuade the court that the exemption clause is fair.
197
 
However, it is unlikely that the court will uphold an exemption clause when negligence is 
shown when a person dies or is injured, especially when a consumer participates in an 
activity that cannot be considered dangerous, such as entering into premises via a hotel 
gate.
198
 The implication of such an exemption clause that excludes the supplier‟s liability for 
negligence is that it will not be considered fair in terms of section 48. Nevertheless, the court 
is likely to uphold such an exemption clause where risky activities are involved, provided the 
consumer voluntarily undertakes to expose him or herself to some form risk.
199
 For instance, 
when a consumer gets injured at an amusement park, the supplier is, it is submitted, more 
likely to succeed in proving that the exemption clause is fair. 
Where risky activities are involved, it may be more reasonable to allow a supplier to exempt 
itself from liability from mere negligence because it is far more likely in such a situation that 
accidents can occur. However, they will not be able to escape liability when they act in a 
reckless fashion. This is because consumers voluntarily seek to engage in adventurous 
activities, and such activities usually come with risk.
200
 Tait and Newman argue that “it 
would be against the interest of justice and fairness if a party is prevented by law from 
protecting herself from a civil liability claim despite the other party‟s willingness to contract 
on that basis, especially in the context of high-risk situations and where the supplier has 
complied with the formal requirements of section 49”.201 
 It is also important to take into account that the presumption in respect of section 44(3) only 
applies in respect of an exemption clause that excludes liability for death or injury and not for 
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loss or damages to property.
202
 Therefore a supplier wanting to avoid liability in respect of 
the death or injury of a consumer has to prove to the court that they are providing an 
inherently risky service such as bungee jumping or abseiling. By including an exemption 
clause, they are able to cut down the cost of doing business,
203
 such as having to carry the 
cost of expensive insurance. It may well be that the cost of insurance is so high that it may be 
impossible to offer certain services in which some consumers may want to participate. 
Furthermore, the supplier has to show that the consumer‟s attention was drawn to fact, nature, 
and potential effect of the exemption clause before participating in the activity. Therefore, the 
consumer was able to make an informed choice about whether or not to participate in the 
activity. 
The supplier also has to show that the terms and conditions of the exemption notice are 
clearly visible, in written contracts. For example, it is sensible for the supplier to have the 
exemption notice on the front page of the contract close to the primary terms and written in a 
font different from that of the other terms so that it is easy for the consumer to notice the 
exemption clause. 
204
 The supplier should also go further and point out the exemption clause 
to consumers and explain the consequences of the clause to consumers. In the case of a 
displayed notice, the supplier has to demonstrate to the court that the notice was displayed in 
a place where the consumer on entering the premises to participate in the risky activity could 
not have failed to observe the exemption provision.
205
 Where the consumer contracted with 
the supplier to participate in the risky activity in advance, such as by making an online 
booking, the supplier would have to display all the details of the activity on the web page,
206
 
and the exemption provision should be highlighted in bold next to the primary terms of the 
agreement. This would enable the consumer to make an informed decision about whether 
they want to engage in the activity. 
One feature of a written document that contains exemption clauses is a medical document 
where the consumer clarifies that they are medically fit and capable of participating in the 
activity and do not have any medical condition that would prevent them from participating in 
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 However, not all consumers who participate in risky activities are honest 
about, or aware of, their level of fitness, and undertake to participate in an activity that could 
seriously threaten their well-being. In unfortunate circumstance when an accident occurs, 
consumers will invariably try to hold the supplier responsible for the damages that they 
suffer. The supplier will in such instances rely on an exemption clause to avoid liability. In 
proving that such reliance is reasonable and fair, the supplier can rely on the medical 
indemnity form that the consumer signed in which he/she acknowledged that that he/she was 
medically fit to participate in the activity.  
Regulation 44(3)(b) prevents the supplier from “excluding or limiting the legal rights and 
remedies of a consumer against the supplier or another party in the event of total or partial 
breach by the supplier of any other obligation provided for in any agreement”.208 The effect 
of this regulation seems to make all exemption clauses which are not void for endeavouring 
to deprive a consumer of a right provided by the CPA, presumably unfair in terms of section 
48.
209
 An example of such a clause is a clause that prevents a consumer from claiming under 
section 61 for injury, death, or damages to property.  
The consequence of regulation 44(3) is that a supplier will not be able to avoid liability using 
the exemption clause where the consumer has not undertaken to engage in a risky activity.
210
 
The exemption clause will be regarded as being unfair in terms of section 48 of the CPA. 
This is endorsed in terms of section 48(1)(c), which provides that an agreement is prohibited 
if it requires “the consumer to waive any rights, assume any obligation, and waive any 
liability of the supplier”.211 Section 52(1)(a) read with section 52(3) of the CPA gives the 
court the power to strike down a provision in a contract if it contravenes section 48. The court 
may declare a contractual provision unfair in whole or part, and may make an order that is 
reasonable and just in the circumstances. 
4.5 Blacklisted terms  
The CPA also makes provision for so-called “blacklisted” terms that cannot directly or 
indirectly be included by the supplier in a consumer contract. For the purposes of this 
                                                             
207
 Buckley „Adventure tourism management‟ (2010). https://www.amazon.com/Adventure-Tourism-
Management-Ralf (Accessed 20 June 2017).  
208
 Act 68 of 2008. 
209
 Naude and Eiselen Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) reg 44–17. 
210
 Naude and Eiselen Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) sections 48–21. 
211
Act 68 of 2008. 
31 
 
dissertation, section 51(1)(c) is particularly important. In terms of this section, “a supplier 
must not make a transaction or agreement that purports to limit the supplier from liability for 
any loss directly or indirectly attributable to the gross negligence of the supplier or any 
person acting for or controlled by the supplier.” 212 As a result, a supplier cannot rely on an 
exemption clause where the death or injury of a consumer was the result of gross negligence 
on the part of the supplier. This means that exemption clauses which have in the past been 
very broadly worded to include any loss or damage “howsoever caused” can no longer be 
interpreted to allow the supplier to contract out of liability for gross negligence. The term 
“gross negligence” is not defined in the CPA, and it is not clear when conduct will be 
regarded as gross negligence, and when the action will constitute ordinary negligence.
213
 It 
seems the legislator left it to the courts to determine what constitutes gross negligence by 
looking at whether the supplier could have avoided the harm suffered by the consumer by the 
exercise of reasonable care. 
4.6 Adequate notice on limitation of risk 
Section 49(1)(a)
214
 provides that “a notice to the consumer or provision relating to the 
agreement that limits risk or liability of a supplier must be brought to the attention of a 
consumer”. Such exemption notice must be written in plain language as provided for in terms 
of section 22
215
 of the CPA. The attention of the consumer must be drawn to the notice in a 
“conspicuous manner” and form that is likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert 
consumer.
216
 The requirement “in a conspicuous manner” refers to the steps that must be 
taken by the supplier to bring the exemption clause to the attention of the consumer. 
217
 Tait 
and Newman argue that it is not enough for the supplier to print the exemption clause on the 
back of the document while the key terms are printed on the front, even if this is done in 
different fonts and the exemption clause is highlighted in bold.
218
 They advise that when the 
exemption clause is contained in a written agreement it must be displayed on the front page 
with all the other the key terms to the agreement and be in a size and font that will result in its 
being noticed by the consumer.
219
 If the exemption clause is contained in a displayed notice it 
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must be displayed at a place where a consumer would expect to find such a notice and must 
be visible and large enough for any consumer to be able to read.
220
  
In addition, section 49(2)(c) provides that “ if an exemption a provision or notice concerns an 
activity or facility that is subject to risk … that could result in serious injury or death, the 
supplier is required to draw the fact, nature and potential effect of the risk to the consumer in 
a manner that satisfies the requirements of subsections (3) and (5), and the consumer must 
consent by initialling or signing the provision or otherwise acting in a manner consistent with 
acknowledgement of notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the provision”.221 The 
supplier is required to draw the consumer‟s attention to the fact, nature and potential effect of 
the risk even if it is reasonably foreseeable by the consumer, which may result in serious 
death or injury. Van Eeden submits that “the phrase, fact, nature and potential effect clearly 
indicate that the supplier is required to ensure that the consumer has an adequate 
understanding and appreciation of the risk, as opposed to superficial awareness of the 
risk”.222  
In circumstances where the consumer does not have an adequate understanding of the nature 
of the risk, the supplier will have to take further steps to ensure that the consumer 
understands the risk. Where necessary, the supplier should in the case of a written warning 
verbally explain the consequences of the exemption provision to the consumer. It is essential 
that when consumers undertake to participate in risky activities, suppliers take extra steps to 
ensure that they know, understand and appreciate the risks and consequences of participating 
in that activity. This would also apply to a situation where the consumer is well educated and 
could be expected to be aware of the risk. Perhaps suppliers of risky activities should go as 
far as highlighting the fact that such an activity could result in serious injury or death. 
Furthermore, the CPA requires suppliers to draw consumers‟ attention to the exemption 
clause before they engage in the activity or enter the facility.
223
 Therefore, when consumers 
make bookings online for a family fun day at a recreational park, the supplier will not be able 
to demand payment at that time and then present the document containing the exemption 
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clause to the consumers when they arrive at the facility.
224
 The supplier is required, at the 
time when the booking is made, to explain the implications and consequences of an 
exemption provision. It is submitted that the supplier should also send a copy of the 
document by email to consumers.
225
 This will give consumers the opportunity to change their 
minds and/or make a well-informed decision about whether they want to participate in the 
risky activity with full knowledge of the exemption clause.  
Suppliers are also required to give consumers an adequate opportunity to receive and 
comprehended notices. 
226
 This means that when suppliers present the exemption notice to 
consumers, they must give consumers an adequate opportunity to read and understand the 
consequence of the provision, and to ask suppliers any further questions about the terms and 
conditions of the agreement.
227
 Once consumers have an adequate understanding of the 
exemption notice, they will be able to make an informed decision about whether they want to 
participate in the risky activity. Once the service provider has taken all the necessary steps to 




It is important when dealing with risky activities also to take into account section 58(1), 
which “requires a supplier of any facility that is subject to a risk of an unusual character or 
nature, a risk of which a consumer could not reasonably be expected to be aware, or which an 
ordinarily alert consumer could not reasonably be expected to contemplate, in the 
circumstances, or a risk that could result in serious injury or death”. The supplier must 
specifically, “draw the fact, nature and potential effect of that risk” to the attention of 
consumers in a form and manner that meets the standards set out in section 49. This further 
highlights the importance to the supplier of a risky activity of taking steps to ensure that a 
consumer has a complete understanding of all the risks involved before the consumer can be 
required to participate in the risky activity. 
Naude points out that section 49 does not spell out the consequences when a supplier does not 
comply with its requirements. For this, one has to consider section 52 which deals with the 
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power of the courts to ensure fair terms.
229
 Section 52(4) provides that “if a term or condition 
of an agreement does not satisfy the requirements of section 49, the court may make an order 
severing the provision from the agreement, or declaring it to have no force or effect in terms 
of section 52(4)”. The effect of this provision is that unless the courts exercise their discretion 
to sever or nullify the provision, it continues to be part of the contact and may be relied on by 
the supplier.
230
 This means that an exemption clause that unfairly limits consumers‟ rights 
will continue to have force, and apply to all consumers who enter into an agreement with the 
supplier unless it has been declared invalid by the court. 
4.7 Liability for damages caused by goods 
Section 61 introduces product liability for any damages or injuries suffered by consumers 
resulting from a product failure, defect or hazard, inadequate warnings, or instructions.
231
 In 
terms of section 61(2),
232
 a supplier refers to any person “who applies, supplies, installs or 
provides access to any goods, [and who] must be regarded as a supplier of those goods to the 
consumer and thus extends the concept of product liability to the supplier of services”. 
Therefore, a supplier of a risky activity can be held liable for damages or injuries suffered by 
consumers as a result of product failure, defect or hazard, or failing to give the consumer 
adequate instructions or warnings before taking part in the risky activity. This section 
imposes strict liability on the supplier as the consumer need not prove negligence on the part 
of the supplier. However, a supplier of a risky activity will not be held liable where the harm 
or injuries suffered by the consumer were caused by the consumer‟s failure to comply with 
the instructions provided by the supplier prior to partaking in the activity, or where the claim 
is brought by the consumer more than three years after the consumer has suffered the 
damages or injuries. 
233
 
When the injuries suffered by consumers are caused by the supplier‟s failure to maintain the 
equipment adequately and provide instructions as to how the activity is to be conducted, the 
supplier cannot escape liability by relying on the exemption clause, because to do so would 
be unfair to the consumer. This is further endorsed by regulation 44(3)(a), which provides 
that “it is unfair to exclude the supplier‟s liability for damages or injuries caused to the 
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consumer through the act or omission of the supplier in terms of section 61”.234 In order to 
avoid liability under section 61 of the CPA, suppliers or service providers of risky activities 
need to ensure that they adopt risk management strategies, such as ensuring that equipment 
used to facilitate the activity is in a good condition and replaced when it is necessary. 
Furthermore, suppliers should also conduct formal tests of the equipment used to facilitate the 
activity before consumers are required to participate in the activity. Suppliers must also 
employ skilled and trained staff who must conduct routine checks and supervise consumers 
while participating in the activity.  
It is also advisable for suppliers of risky activities to take out product liability insurance to 
ensure that they are covered for potential claims that may arise as a result of harm suffered by 
consumer caused by any defects in the equipment.
235
 However, high insurance premiums may 
be unaffordable for suppliers, and they may be tempted to cut costs when it comes to 
ensuring that they have adequate insurance.
236
 This leaves consumers in the hands of the 
supplier if they have a valid claim. If suppliers cannot afford adequate insurance, they will 
have to carry the financial implications of the claim brought against them by consumers. A 
large claim could have the effect of crippling a business. As stated above, high insurance 
premiums also affect consumers because the costs are passed on to the consumer because the 
supplier will increase the cost of its services. In circumstances where the insurance premium 
is too high for the supplier, it is preferable for the supplier and insurance company to adopt a 
method whereby the risk is shared equally by them, in return for the supplier paying a 
reduced premium amount. 
237
 
4.8 Consideration of some previously decided cases 
The purpose of this subheading is to consider some of the previously decided cases in order 
to see whether or not these cases would have been decided differently had the CPA been in 
operation at the time.
238
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It is submitted that in Afrox Healthcare (Pty) Ltd, which involved a hospital contract with an 
exemption clause, the court would have come to a different conclusion had this case been 
decided after the commencement of the CPA.
239
 This is because the admission clerk did not 
draw the attention of the patient to the clause on admission. The court, in relying on section 
58 read with section 49 of the CPA, would have expected the clerk to draw the attention of 
the patient to the exemption clause, and for the hospital to ensure that the exemption clause 
was not buried away in small print. Therefore, it is submitted that the court would have found 
that the exemption clause was unfair in terms of section 48, and the court would have had the 
power, in terms of section 52(3), to declare the exemption clause invalid and therefore not 
binding on the patient.  
Durban’s Water Wonderland v Botha concerned a mother and daughter who were injured 
when they were flung off a ride at the Durban‟s water amusement park. Evidence showed that 
the cause of the accident was the failure of a hydraulic system governing the vertical 
movement of the car in which they were seated.
240
 The mother brought a claim against the 
amusement park for damages that she had suffered and on behalf of her two-year-old child.
241
 
The amusement park relied on the indemnity clause exempting it from liability in respect of 
damages and injuries arising out of use of any of the facilities in the amusement park. 
242
 The 
court in this case had to address three issues: 
1. Whether a disclaimer contained in a notice painted on the windows of the ticket 
offices in the amusement park had been incorporated into the contract governing the 
use of the park‟s amenities; 
2. Whether on a proper construction of the notice the amusement park was exempted 
from liability for negligence; and 
3. Whether the appellant, as operator of the amusement park, had been negligent. 
The court found that it was clear from the language used in the disclaimer that any liability 
founded upon negligence in the design and construction of the amusement park amenities fell 
squarely within its ambit. Furthermore, whether the exemption clause formed part of the 
contract governing the use of the park‟s amenities was considered with reference to where the 
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exemption clause was displayed. The court held that the notice was displayed at a place 
where one would expect to find any notice containing terms governing the contract entered 
into by the respondent. A reasonable person approaching the office in order to purchase the 
ticket could not have failed to observe the notice painted in white on the cashier‟s window. 
Considering the nature of the contract and the circumstances in which it would normally be 
entered into, the existence of the notice could not have been unexpected to a reasonable 
person approaching the office to purchase tickets. Mrs Botha also testified and said that she 
had known that there was such a notice at amusement parks. Therefore, the court concluded 
that the amusement park had done everything it could reasonably do to draw the consumers‟ 
attention to the exemption notice.  
If the judgment of Botha had been delivered after the commencement of the CPA, the court 
would have reached a different conclusion because the accident was caused by a failure in the 
hydraulic system governing the vertical movement of the ride in which they had been seated. 
The court would have found in favour of Mrs Botha regardless of whether the amusement 
park had taken steps to draw the clause to the attention of Mrs Botha, and of the fact that the 
notice was clearly visible to a person approaching the ticket office to purchase tickets. This is 
because the cause of the accident was the amusement park‟s defective ride. Therefore, it is 
submitted that because of the introduction of section 61 in the CPA, the amusement park 
would have been liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiff.  This would have been a 
good decision if the amusement park was found liable for the injuries sustained by Mrs Botha 
and her daughter because it would have been unfair, unreasonable and unjust to allow the 
amusement park to escape liability using the exemption clause were the accident was caused 
by a failure in the hydraulic system governing the vertical movement of the ride. 
In the case of Duffield v Lilyfontein School,
243
 Duffield fell from a zip-wire slide strung from 
the top of a scaffold platform to the ground level, while taking part in a school corporate 
adventure race. She was injured and she sued Lilyfontein School and three other defendants 
who were organisers of the race.
244
 Prior to taking part in the activity, Duffield had signed a 
document containing an exemption clause that excluded the corporate venture‟s liability.245 
Duffield contended that the cause of the accident was the negligence of the staff operating the 
platform to which the zip-wire was affixed because the staff had failed to secure the safety of 
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the harness around the plaintiff‟s torso correctly; alternatively, they had failed to ensure that 
the plaintiff herself had correctly secured the harness prior to her jumping off the platform.
246
 
The indemnity form signed by the plaintiff was conditional upon its being established that the 
defendants had done everything that was reasonably necessary to ensure that stringent safety 
measures had been put in place during the race so as to limit the risk of personal accident or 
injury to the participants.
247
 The court found that the defendants had failed to take the 
measures necessary to ensure the plaintiff‟s safety and therefore they were liable for the 
damages suffered by the plaintiff.  
In applying the CPA to the Duffield case, it is submitted that the court would have reached 
the same conclusion. Although Duffield‟s attention had been drawn to the exemption clause, 
and she had accepted by signing the written contract, the exemption clause stipulated that 
Lilyfontein would be able to escape liability only if necessary stringent safety measures had 
been taken in order to minimise the risk. In this case, the school had failed to take those 
measures necessary to minimise the risk as the staff operating the platform had failed to 
secure the harness around the plaintiff‟s torso correctly. Therefore, in such circumstances, the 
enforcement of the exemption clause by the court would have been unfair, unreasonable, and 
unjust in terms of section 48 of the CPA. 
In Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel,
248
 the plaintiff checked into the hotel and signed a registration 
card with a clause that excluded the hotel‟s liability for “ any injury to, or death of, any 
person or the loss or destruction of , or damage to any property on the premises, whether 
arising from fire theft or any cause, and by whomsoever caused or arising from the 
negligence (gross or otherwise) or wrongful act by any employee of the hotel.”249 The 
following morning the plaintiff suffered serious bodily injuries when a heavy steel gate fell 
on top of him as he was leaving the hotel.
250
 The court had to determine whether the hotel 
was liable for bodily injuries sustained by the defendant.
251
 The court was of the view that 
exemption clauses that exclude liability for bodily injuries in hotels and other public spaces 
generally have the effect of denying the claimant judicial redress. The court submitted that 
the plaintiff was a guest in the hotel.
252
 To enter and exit was an integral part of his stay. A 
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guest in a hotel should not take his life in his hands when he exits through the hotel gates.
253
 
The court held that to deny him judicial redress for injuries he suffered in doing so, which 
were caused by the negligent conduct of the hotel, offends against the notions of justice and 
fairness.
254
 The court in Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel applied the principles that were 
enunciated in Barkhuizen, that a further enquiry is necessary where a contractual clause limits 
a person‟s right to a judicial remedy.255 It must be determined whether in the circumstances 
of a particular case the enforcement of such a contractual term would result in an injustice 
because of the particular circumstances of the case.
256
 The court came to the conclusion that 
the enforcement of such a clause would be unfair and unjust. In the words of Ngcobo J: “(a) 
court will bear in mind the need to recognise freedom of contract, but the court will not let 
blind reliance on the principle of freedom of contract override the need to ensure that 
contracting parties must have access to courts”.257  
The case of Naidoo can be distinguished from the case of Durban’s Water Wonderland.258 
Durban’s Water Wonderland involved an exemption clause where there was an inherent risk 
associated with activity; and provided the consumer is aware of the risk and consents to the 
risk, it can more easily be argued that the exemption clause should be upheld. In Naidoo, 
there was no question of an inherent risk and so an exemption clause that excludes the hotel 
from liability, in these circumstances, should be regarded as unfair and unjust in terms of 
section 48 of the CPA.  
A more recent case is that of Klassen v Blue Lagoon Hotel.
259
 In this case the court reached 
the conclusion that the decision in Naidoo was incorrect. Although the case was decided 
when the CPA was already in operation, no reference to the CPA was made. It is submitted 
that the court‟s decision in this case was correct as the evidence showed that the hotel had a 
properly functioning system in place in terms of which regular checks were conducted to 
ensure that the bathroom was clean. As required by section 49 of the CPA, steps were taken 
by the hotel to draw the exemption clause to the attention of Klassen as there was a notice 
displayed at the hotel entrance and on the guard house. Therefore, the exclusion clause should 
be regarded as fair in terms of section 48.  
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4.9 Concluding remarks 
Since the introduction of the CPA, certain exemption clauses have mostly been banned, and 
while others can be included, this is on condition that adequate notice is given to consumers 
and that they are aware of the risks involved and agree to those risks. The problem is that 
consumers often do not read the contracts even when they are asked to sign them. This is 
because consumers are more interested in the services being offered rather than knowing the 
consequences of engaging in the services offered by the supplier. Another reason is that in 
written agreements, the document may be lengthy and complex, and the layout of the 
document may be designed to distract the consumer‟s attention.260 The font size plays an 
important factor and may discourage a consumer from reading the document.
261
 Many 
contracts that consumers come across are written in a small font and where there is an 
exemption clause, it is usually hidden away in fine print. The terms used in the document also 
contribute to consumers not reading and understanding the document. For instance, the use of 
legal terms in a document may affect the consumer‟s ability to understand the terms and 
conditions,
262
 and their capability of being able to make an informed decision about whether 
to engage in the services offered by the supplier. The benefit for the consumers who do read 
is that they are able to bargain better terms with the supplier that are to their benefit, such as 
arguing for the use of fairer terms by the supplier. 
263
 
The CPA has attempted to deal with these problems associated with exemption clauses and 
standard-form contracts by placing a much heavier responsibility on suppliers to ensure that 
consumers know and understand the risks involved with the activity and know and 
understand the terms of the contract into which they are entering. To encourage consumers to 
read contracts, suppliers must take steps to simplify the language and the structure of the 
contract in written agreements, by removing, for example, Latin phrases and having proper 
headings. In the case of displayed notices, the visual appearance of the notice must be 
appealing and easily readable. This will lead to fewer disputes about whether an exemption 
clause is fair or whether the attention of the consumer was drawn to the contractual provision. 
As seen in the above cases, when the courts are faced with disputes regarding an exemption 
clause, the main issues to be determined by the court are always whether the exemption 
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clause is fair and reasonable, whether the consumer was aware of the existence of the 
exemption clause,, and when it comes to risky activities, whether the consumer was fully 
aware of the risks involved and consented to those risks. For this reason, as stated above, 
when it comes to certain risky activities such as bungee jumping or deep-sea diving, suppliers 
should go as far as warning consumers that there is the risk of serious injury and even death. 
Even though the CPA imposes certain obligations on a supplier to ensure that the consumer is 
aware of and understands certain terms of agreements into which they enter, these duties are 
not absolute, as some form of alertness may be expected from the consumer. According to 
Mupangavanhu, “the CPA does not provide consumers with much protection as what it gives 
on one hand it takes with another, in relation to exemption clause”.264 This is because the 
CPA requires “the fact, nature and potential effect of the activity to be drawn to the attention 
of the consumer in a conspicuous manner that is likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily 
alert consumer”.265 The consequence of this provision is that when the supplier has taken 
steps to draw the consumer‟s attention to the provision, the consumer cannot argue that he 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER LAW RELATING  
TO RISKY ACTIVITIES 
 5.1 Introduction  
As stated above, the Australian position has been considered because it is useful to observe 
how other jurisdictions have dealt with the problem of liability when suppliers of risky 
activities are involved. In Australia, consumer issues relating to contracts entered into with 
the supplier are dealt with in terms of Australian Competition and Consumer Act of 2010 
(CCA). The CCA came into operation on 1 January 2011; the Act aims to ensure consumer 
protection and fair business practices. The CCA in Schedule 2 sets out the Australian 
Consumer Law (ACL). The ACL includes consumer guarantees, which prevent the supplier 
from excluding liability when certain business practices are involved,
267
 but the ACL makes 
special provision for suppliers of recreational activities to exclude liability in terms of section 
139A. Australian law also makes provision for the Civil Liability Act (CLA),
268
 which 
creates rules for dealing with risks and the nature and impact of warnings given by the 
supplier to the consumer. Furthermore, the CLA aims to makes it easier for suppliers to 
enforce exemption clauses, as it allows suppliers to avoid liability for injuries sustained from 
obvious and inherent risks, and it makes special provision for the recovery of compensation 
for injuries sustained in risky “recreational” activities.  
5.2 Australian Consumer Law Guarantees in terms of the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 
5.2.1 Unfair contract terms 
In terms of section 23(1) of the Australian Consumer Law Guarantees (ACL), a term is 




1. It would cause a significant imbalance in the parties‟ rights and obligations arising 
under the contract; 
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2. It is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the party that would 
be advantaged by the term;  
3. It would cause detriment to a party if it were to be applied or relied on; and 
4. The unfair contract terms provisions do not apply to business-to-business contracts.  
The onus is on the supplier to prove on a balance of probabilities that a term in their contract 
is fair. In determining whether a term in a contract would cause a substantial imbalance in the 
parties‟ contractual obligations and rights, the court would include a factual assessment of the 
evidence that is available.
270
 The party in favour of whom the term operates needs to provide 
evidence that its genuine interest is sufficiently compelling to overcome any harm or loss 
caused to the consumer, and therefore the term in the contract is reasonably necessary.
271
 
Such evidence includes the steps taken to mitigate the risk or, the particular industry 
practice.
272
 Furthermore, the court in determining whether the term is unfair will have to take 
into account the extent to which the term is transparent.
273
 A contract term will be transparent 
if it is expressed in reasonably plain language, legible, presented clearly, and readily available 
to any party affected by the term.
274
 The fact that a term is not transparent does not mean that 
it is unfair, and transparency will not necessary overcome the unfairness of an exemption 
clause. Furthermore, in determining whether the contract is unfair, the court will take into 
account the contract as a whole. It is submitted that in considering the contract as a whole a 
court will often need to balance the legitimate interest of the supplier‟s business against the 
detriment the term would cause to the consumer if enforced. 
5.2.2 Due care and skill 
Section 60 of the Australian Consumer Law Act provides that “if a person supplies, in trade 
or commerce, services to a consumer, there is a guarantee that the services will be rendered 
with due care and skill”. Significantly, since section 60 creates a guarantee, the consumer can 
recover damages for any harm suffered as a result of a failure to comply with the guarantee if 
it was reasonably foreseeable that the consumer would suffer such harm or loss because of 
such failure.
275
 The case of Alameddine v Glenworth Valley Horse Riding illustrates the 
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 The plaintiff was injured while riding on a quad bike at the defendant‟s recreational 
quad biking park. The plaintiff was part of a group of quad bikers led by an instructor who 
were returning from a purpose-built quad biking track to the administration centre. The 
instructor accelerated, causing the riders behind him, including the plaintiff, to accelerate to 
keep up. The plaintiff lost control of her bike, fell off it, and was injured. The court held that 
the instructor had been negligent. The instructor was responsible for controlling the group‟s 
speed along the trail, and his speed on the return trip was much faster than it had been on the 
way to the track, such that the riders following him, including the plaintiff, had had trouble 
keeping up. The court further held that the plaintiff‟s excessive speed was brought about by 
the need to keep up with the instructor. Therefore, the instructor, in increasing his speed, 
caused and contributed to the plaintiff‟s accident. The court concluded that Glenworth was 
liable for breach of statutory guarantee for the failure to comply with the guarantee given to 
the plaintiff that the services would be rendered with due care and skill in terms of section 60.  
The court in Alameddine also took into consideration that prior to arrival at the defendant‟s 
quad biking park, the plaintiff‟s mother had booked and paid for quad biking. Upon arrival at 
the defendant‟s recreational park, the plaintiff‟s sister signed a document containing an 
exemption clause on behalf of the plaintiff. The court held that the contract had been formed 
on the previous day when the plaintiff‟s mother had booked and paid for the activity. The 
plaintiff‟s mother was presented with the document containing the exemption clause only on 
the day of arrival at the recreational park. The court further held that the defendant could not 
rely on the exemption clause to avoid liability for his negligence because the contract had 
been concluded before the arrival of the plaintiff at the recreational park. The court‟s 
approach in Alameddine is in line with the CPA, as the CPA, in terms of section 49, would 
have required the supplier to notify the plaintiff‟s mother of the exemption clause before 
arrival at the quad biking recreational park. This would be to ensure that the plaintiff would 
be able to make a clear decision about whether he/she wanted to take part in the activity. 
 In the case of Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Ltd,
277
 the plaintiff took part 
in sail training activity on a training ship owned by Leeuwin.
278
 She fell from the rigging of 
the sail training ship.
279
 The court found that the defendant was liable as he had failed to 
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exercise due care and skill to ensure that the belt had been properly secured.
280
 Therefore, the 
exemption clause in the contract signed by the plaintiff was invalid and unenforceable. 
Moreover, section 61 guarantees that the services supplied will be fit for the purposes for 
which they were intended. 
281
 In the event that any loss or damages arise as a result of a 
breach of this requirement, a consumer may have a claim of negligence against the supplier. 
However, this guarantee does not apply in situations where the consumer did not rely on (or it 
was unreasonable for the consumer to rely on) the skill or judgment of the supplier.
282
 This 
guarantee also does not apply to any supplier of services who is a qualified professional in 
that area of expertise.
283
 A breach of a guarantee that the service is fit for the purpose it was 
intended is usually not based on a finding of carelessness, but instead on a failure of the 
services to fulfil that purpose even in the absence of carelessness.  
5.2.3 The operation of exemption clauses 
Section 64 provides that a term in a contract is void to the extent that the term purports to 
exclude, restrict, or modify any liability of a person for failure to comply with a guarantee, 
the exercise of any right conferred in terms of this provision, or the application of any of the 
provisions.
284
 Therefore, an exemption clause that operates to exclude the suppliers‟ liability 
for failure to comply with a guarantee and, restricts the exercise of rights conferred by any 
guarantee is void and unenforceable. However, section 139A allows for the exclusion of 
statutory guarantees in relation to risky recreational activities as provided for in the Act,
285
 
especially in relation to sections 60 and 61 of the ACL; such provision will not be invalid 
under section 64 by the mere fact that it purports only to exclude and restrict such statutory 
guarantee.
286
 However, this section applies to liability only for death or personal injury, and 
will not apply to personal injuries that are caused by the reckless conduct of the supplier.
287
 
In terms of the Act, the supplier‟s conduct is reckless if:288 
(a) The supplier is aware, or should reasonably have been aware, of a significant risk that 
the conduct could result in personal injury to another person; and  
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(b) The supplier engages in the conduct despite the risk and without adequate 
justification. 
Even though section 139A allows suppliers of risky activities to exclude liability for any loss 
or harm suffered by the consumer, it does not set out how the exemption clause is supposed 
to be worded and incorporated into the agreement.  
Moreover, section 267 of the ACL entitles a consumer to recover compensation if a guarantee 
is not complied with. This means that if a acts in a reckless fashion and breaches any one of 
the guarantees mentioned above, that supplier will not be able to rely on an exemption clause 
to avoid liability for any injury suffered by the consumer.  
5.3  Civil Liability Act 
The Civil Liability Act was introduced in 2002 to address the problems in relation to tort 
(delict) law and the resulting increase in insurance premiums. The Act was also introduced to 
promote the notion of personal responsibility of consumers who engage in risky activities 
which makes it difficult for them to succeed on a claim brought against the supplier where the 
risk is obvious or inherent.
289
 The Act makes it easier for suppliers to limit the liability 
arising from recreational activities where there is a risk warning, exemption clause, or 
disclaimer notice, and deems a warning given to a consumer to be sufficient even if it is the 
only warning given. The Act contains a number of sections, referred to as divisions, that aim 
to address the problems that arise when dealing with risky activities. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the following divisions are relevant: 
 Division 4 deals with assumption of risk. This is where the risk is obvious or is 
inherent in the activity. There is no proactive duty on the supplier to warn the 
consumer where the risk is obvious. Where the risk is inherent, the liability of the 
supplier is not excluded because there is a duty on the supplier to warn of the risk. 
 Division 5 distinguishes between recreational activities and dangerous recreational 
activities.  
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5.3.1 Liability for obvious and inherent risk 
 In terms of section 5F(1), an obvious risk is a risk which is obvious to a reasonable 
person;
290
 or; a matter of common knowledge or is patent.
291
 A risk can be obvious even if it 
has little chance of occurring or if it is not conspicuous, prominent, or physically 
observable.
292
 A consumer who is injured as a result of an obvious risk in a risky activity is 
presumed to have been aware of the risk, except if he or she can prove on a balance of 
probabilities that he or she was not aware of the risk.
293
 A consumer is regarded as being 
aware of the risk if he or she is aware of the type or kind of risk, even if he and she is are not 
aware of the exact nature, extent, or manner of occurrence of the risk.
294
  
The classification of what constitutes an obvious risk is the main area in which the courts 
have been able to provide guidance. In establishing whether a risk is obvious, the court will 
have to consider the circumstances of the case. In the case of Streller v Albury City 
Council,
295
 Streller attended an Australian Day Celebration held at the local park within the 
Municipality of Albury City Council (“the council”). The event had been organised by the 
council.
296
 Streller, aged 16, was an expert diver, and had jumped from a 10-metre platform. 
At the event Streller swung from a rope hanging from a tree branch into a river and struck his 
head on the riverbed, rendering him a quadriplegic.
297
 The main issue before the court was 
whether the council was liable for the injuries he had sustained.
298
 The court took into 
consideration whether at the time Streller proposed to use the rope swing to do the back flip, 
the likelihood of him being injured from impact with the riverbed “would have been obvious" 
to a reasonable 16-year-old in his position.
299
 The court held that the risk of injury from 
diving or landing head first in water which is or could be too shallow would surely be an 
obvious one to an adult exercising common sense and judgment.
300
 Furthermore, the court 
held that Streller had not checked the depth of the water by wading in the areas where he 
might possibly land. 
301
 There were people standing in the river, including near the middle 
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and adjacent to the position of the tree and the rope swing.
302
 The court held that this 
confirmed that there were variations in its depth due to sand bars, mud banks, and the like, 
and that it grew shallower towards the middle.
303
 The primary judge held that this risk of 
harm that existed would have been “obvious” to a reasonable person in Streller's position.304 
Further, the court held that the obvious risk, which resulted in Streller‟s injury, was one 
which made the activity in which he was engaged “dangerous”. The primary judge therefore 
concluded that since the risk had been obvious, the council was not liable for the harm 
suffered by Streller.  
In the case of Doubleday v Kelly,
305
 a seven-year-old girl was injured while jumping on a 
trampoline wearing roller skates. The girl had been warned before not to go to the trampoline 
unsupervised. The main issue for determination was whether the harm that a child would 
injure themselves after they had been warned not to jump unsupervised was reasonably 
foreseeable. In order to determine whether the risk was “obvious” to a person of her age the 
court attributed her characteristics to the hypothetical reasonable person. The court held that 
the risk could not have been obvious to a seven-year-old child who had no previous 
experience in the use of trampolines or roller skates."
306
 The court also reasoned that it was 
foreseeable that there was a risk of injury if the child was to use the trampoline without adult 
supervision. Giving the child a warning not to use the trampoline unsupervised was not 
enough. The trampoline should have been folded up so no child could jump on it. The court 
therefore concluded that the risk could have not been obvious to a seven-year-old child and 
Doubleday was liable for the injuries sustained by the child.  
In Liverpool Catholic Club Ltd v Moor,
307
 the plaintiff fell down the stairs at an ice-skating 
rink while wearing ice skates. The original judge acknowledged that the relevant risk was the 
risk of falling while walking downstairs when wearing ice skates.
308
 However, when 
determining whether that risk was obvious, the original judge also took into consideration the 
fact that the stairs were wet and of varying dimensions.
309
 Furthermore, the court held that the 
description that was provided by the plaintiff of how he had fallen down the stairs, and the 
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video footage showing how he had fallen , did not show any unreasonable conduct on the 
plaintiff‟s behalf.310 The judge concluded by saying that the defendant had failed to prove 
that the plaintiff had had actual knowledge that he would fall down the stairs while wearing 
ice-skating boots.
311
 The original decision was overturned on appeal because the court took 
into account that he wore size thirteen boots; the blade was longer than the tread of the 
stairs.
312
 The appeal court judge concluded that it would have been obvious to a person in his 
position that the risk of falling was made significantly greater by the fact that he had worn 
boots.
313
 His only contact with the surface was his skate blade, making it more difficult for 
him to keep his balance, and the blade was much longer than an ordinary shoe. Therefore, the 
risk had been obvious to the plaintiff.
314
 
The Civil Liability Act also excludes the supplier‟s liability for injury suffered by a consumer 
as a result of materialisation of an inherent risk.
315
 An inherent risk is defined as something 
that cannot be prevented by the exercise of reasonable care and skill.
316
 In the case of 
Perisher Blue Pty Ltd v Nair-Smith,
317
 Perisher provided chair-lifts which carried skiers from 
a loading station at a lower point on a mountain to a station at a higher point. The chairs were 
attached to a cable and continuously moved in motion up and down. On all the chairs there 
was a lap bar (this prevented people from falling), which lifted up when people got onto the 
chair and was down when people were seated. Nair-Smith, while on a ski field trip, was 
injured when she tried to board a moving chair. Perisher argued that it was not liable for her 
injuries because Nair-Smith‟s injury was the result of the materialisation of a risk of harm 
inherent in the interaction between persons taking their seats and the mechanical limitations 
of the chair. Therefore, as provided for in section 5I, Perisher pleaded that it was not liable in 
negligence for the injury suffered by Smith-Nair.
318
 Perisher‟s defence was rejected both in 
the trial court and appeal court. The courts held that the risk could have been prevented in the 
circumstances if the chair operator had observed the chair as it left the bull wheel (or had 
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noticed the chair with its lowered bar earlier than he did),
319
 and the risk could have been 
prevented by the exercise of reasonable care and skill.  
5.3.2 Dangerous recreational activity and recreational activity 
The Civil Liability Act provides a distinction between a dangerous recreational activity and a 
recreational activity. In terms of the Act, a dangerous recreational activity is an activity that 
involves a significant risk of physical harm.
320




1. Any sport (whether or not the sport is an organised activity); and 
2. Any pursuit or activity engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure; and 
3.  Any pursuit or activity engaged in at a place (such as a beach, park or other 
public open space) where people ordinarily engage in sport or in any pursuit or 
activity for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure. 
Healey argues that the range of activities included in the definition of a “recreational activity” 
is very wide and contains activities which have no element of risk.
322
 It seems to include 




 In relation to dangerous recreational activities, the supplier of a risky activity will not be held 
liable for harm suffered by the consumer as a result of materialisation of an obvious risk at a 
dangerous recreational activity engaged in by the consumer. 
324
 This is the position even if 
the consumer was not aware of the risk. 
325
 The concept of a dangerous recreational activity 
was considered in the case of Alameddine v Glenworth Valley Horse Riding.
326
 Glenworth 
argued that the plaintiff‟s accident resulted from materialisation of an obvious dangerous 
recreational activity.
 327
 The court rejected this argument, and held that the injuries sustained 
by Alameddine did not result from an obvious risk of quad biking.
 328
 Nor was the risk 
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inherent and incidental to quad biking, as “Glenworth portrayed a contrary impression on its 
website by describing quad biking as „surprisingly easy‟”, and riders would receive safety 
briefing and individual training before riding on the quad bikes.
329
  
In Holroyd City Council v Zaiter,
330
 a nine-year-old boy rode a bicycle down a grassed slope 
into a concrete drainage channel. This court found that section 5L was inapplicable because 
that activity (riding a bike) was not a dangerous recreational activity; and in any event, “the 
incidental risk was that the rider might fall off and hit his or her head on the ground or on the 
bike. The risk which eventuated here was not a fall off the bike, but falling a distance of two 
metres into an unfenced concrete channel.” 331 
In the context of a recreational activity, a supplier owes no duty of care to a consumer who 
engages in recreational activity if a warning was given prior to the engagement in the 
activity.
332
 A risk warning in a recreational activity is defined as a “warning that is given in a 
manner that is reasonably likely to result in people being warned of the risk before engaging 
in the recreational activity”.333 Furthermore, the supplier is not required to ascertain whether 
the consumer received or understood the warning or understanding of the warning.
334
 The 
warning given by the supplier may be in writing or oral.  
The issue of whether a warning given by the supplier is effective has been considered in a 
number of cases. In the case of In Action Paint Ball Games Pty Ltd v Baker,
335
 Action Paint 
Ball provided facilities for paint ball and laser tag games to be played on its premises. The 
plaintiff participated in a game of paint ball laser gun. While playing the game, the plaintiff 
was running along one of the tracks when she tripped and fell over a tree root, and sustained a 
fracture to her left elbow. An employee of Action Paint Ball, who was responsible for 
supervising the participants of the game, had spoken to the children before commencing the 
game, and had provided warnings about safety and informed the participants of the rules of 
the game.
336
 The New South Wales court found that Action Paint Ball had been negligent. 
The primary judge held that there had been no warning of risk given to the children before 
the game; and the employee had not warned the children of specific obstacles such as tree 
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 On appeal, Action Paint Ball argued that the trial judge erred in finding it negligent. 
The court held that the trial judge had mistakenly found that the risk posed by the recreational 
activity was not the subject of a risk warning. The court further held that it was not necessary 
that a specific warning be given in respect of a specific hazard. The court also held that the 
plaintiff was not an incapable person for the purpose of section 5M(2), and had the capacity 
to understand the risk warning. The warning was also given in the presence of her father. In 
the circumstances, the appeal judge held that the warning given by Action Paint Ball was 
sufficient. The court also held that the seriousness of the harm was probably less in the bush 
land were the plaintiff was injured than in some other environment. The absence of any 
incidents in the bush land while performing the same activity should have been considered 
when determining what precautions Action Paint Ball should have taken. Finally, the court 
held that there was a social utility in children performing physical activities in a natural 
environment.
338
 The court concluded by saying there was no obligation on Action Paint Ball 
to remove the tree root in the exercise of its duty of care.
339
 
5.3.3 IPP Report on the amended Civil Liability Act 22 of 2002 (CLA)  
Major problems had arisen in Australia over the availability and affordability of public 
liability insurance.
340
 As a way of curtailing the problem, the IPP review panel was mandated 
to lodge an investigation by developing consistent approaches to negligence liability as a 
whole. On 30 September 2002 the panel review delivered the Review of the Law of 
Negligence Final Report (known as the IPP Report).
341
 The IPP Review Report contained 
61 recommendations that addressed certain aspects of negligence. Thereafter, on 5 December 
2002, a consultation draft of the Civil Liability Bill was tabled in parliament.
342
 The Bill in its 
final form implemented the relevant recommendations of the IPP Report and included 




One of the recommendations made by the IPP review panel in the IPP Report was that 
consumers should be held liable for the consequences of their own safety in risky 
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 This meant that the suppliers would not have the same responsibility of giving 
consumers information about the risks involved when participating in risky activities, in 
circumstances where the risk would have been obvious to a reasonable person.
345
 However, 
the report also takes into account that many people who participate in risky activities are 
children, who need and deserve special protection from risk of injury and death.
346
 It was 
with this in mind that the phrase “in the circumstances any reasonable person in the position 
of the participant” has been included in the Act.347 This was done in order to give enough 
room for the law to develop flexibly to provide protection for people who are not fully 
capable adults. Children are not able to take the same level of care for their own physical 




The report also provides a distinction between inherent and obvious risk:
349
 
“An inherent risk is defined as a risk of a situation or activity that cannot be removed or 
avoided by the exercise of reasonable care. An inherent risk may be obvious, but equally may 
not be. Conversely, an obvious risk may be inherent but equally may not be. It may be a risk 
that could be avoided or removed by the exercise of reasonable care. This means that an 
obvious risk may be a risk that a person will be negligent.” 
What constitutes an obvious or inherent risk is not easily determined. IPP recommendations 
stated that it would be undesirable and impractical to define what constitutes an obvious risk 
because this is something which should be left to the courts to decide depending on the 
circumstances of every case.
350
  
5.4 Concluding remarks 
The legal position in Australia in respect of exemption clauses is distinguishable from the 
South African position. In Australia the Competition and Consumer Act prohibits the use of 
exemption clauses where the supplier failed to comply with a statutory guarantee,
351
 but 
makes special allowance for exclusion of liability in risky activities in terms of section 
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 However, a supplier will be able to avoid liability for personal injury or death if the 
harm suffered by the consumer was not caused by their recklessness.
353
 The CLA deals with 
issues relating to risky activities; the Act allows suppliers to avoid liability in circumstances 
where the risk is obvious and inherent in the activity. Furthermore, in terms of the Act a 
supplier of a risky activity will not be held liable for failing to warn the consumer of an 
inherent and obvious risk. This can be compared to South Africa, where the CPA requires a 
supplier of a risky facility to draw the consumer‟s attention to any risk and if the supplier 
fails to do so, they cannot rely on the exemption clause to avoid liability. The CLA also 
draws a distinction between adults and children, who engage in risky activities. A child will 
be bound by an exemption clause only where a parent has been notified of the risky activity 
prior to the child engaging in the activity. It is evident that the CLA aims to address the issues 
in risky activities and places the responsibility on consumers to take reasonable steps to 
prevent any injury that they may suffer as a result of participating in risky activities where the 
risks are obvious and inherent in the activity. This can be compared to the approach of the 
CPA which places the responsibility on suppliers who want to rely on exemption clauses to 
draw the consumers‟ attention specifically to the risks involved. The CPA does not 
distinguish between normal activities and risky activities, and regardless of whether or not the 
risks should be obvious to an ordinary consumer, the supplier has to take steps to point these 
out. The supplier also bears the onus of proving that exemption clauses which exclude 
liability for death or injury are fair.  
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CHAPTER SIX:  
CONCLUSION 
Before the introduction of the CPA the courts placed great emphasis on the principles of 
pacta sunt servanda and freedom of contract, even in circumstance when the enforcement of 
an exemption clause was unfair to a consumer, and many people would have thought that the 
supplier ought to have drawn the consumer‟s attention to the exemption clause. This was 
demonstrated clearly in the commentaries that discussed the Afrox decision. The common law 
placed a burden on the consumer who disputed the validity of the exemption clause to prove 
that the enforcement of the clause was contrary to public policy. The CPA changes this 
position. With regard to reckless conduct, it is no longer permissible to rely on an exemption 
clause, and in respect of so called “greylisted” terms, a supplier who wants to exclude 
liability for death or injury would have to persuade the court that the exemption clause is fair 
in terms of section 48. The consumer therefore carries the duty in respect of non-greylisted 
terms to prove to the court that the term is unfair.
354
 This position can be distinguished from 
the Australian position as a party that will benefit from the enforcement of the contractual 
provision will have to prove to the court that the enforcement of the provision is fair and 
necessary to protect their legitimate interest. 
355
  
One problem with the CPA is that it does not distinguish between children and adults who 
engage in risky activities. Children are regarded as being in a more vulnerable position than 
adults and deserve to be protected from any form of harm and injury. When dealing with 
children who participate in risky activities, merely taking steps to draw the contractual 
provision to the attention of the child‟s parent is, it is submitted, not sufficient. The supplier 
of a risky activity must ensure that there are stringent safety measures in place to ensure that 
children who engage in risky activities are protected. This would include placing height and 
age restrictions for children below or above a certain height and/or age, and ensuring that the 
equipment that is used to facilitate the activity is kept in a good condition.  
 Moving forward, it is important for the courts to consider whether a clause that limits the 
supplier‟s liability for death or bodily injury is fair and in line with the norms and values of 
society, as such a clause impacts upon the consumer‟s constitutional rights to life and bodily 
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 The question as to whether an exemption clause is valid if it excludes a supplier‟s 
liability when it negligently causes the death of another was left open by Harms JA in the 
case of Johannesburg Country Club v Stott.
357
 Mupangavanhu submits that section 51(1) 
should be amended to include a prohibition against exemption clauses that limit the supplier‟s 
liability in respect of death or personal injury.
358
 This is especially necessary in circumstances 
similar to the case of Naidoo, where a hotel was involved, because in such places a duty rests 
upon the supplier to ensure that the place is safe. A consumer would not expect to face the 
kind of situation that Naidoo was subjected to.  
It is, however, submitted that when it comes to risky activities, the use of exemption clauses 
should be permissible. This is because, when a consumer decides to participate in a risky 
activity, the consumer voluntarily undertakes to expose him- or herself to risks, provided he 
or she is aware of those risks. If the use of exemption clauses when it comes to risky 
activities is not allowed, many businesses would close down because they would not be able 
to meet the legal costs of a consumer‟s claim and would not beg able to afford insurance 
because of high insurance premiums. However, a supplier of a risky activity will be able to 
rely on such exemption clauses only if they comply with the requirements of section 49, 
which requires a supplier of a risky facility or activity to draw the consumer‟s attention to the 
fact, nature, and potential effect of the notice before the consumer engages in the activity. A 
consumer whose attention is drawn to the fact, nature, and effect of the exemption notice is 
able to make an informed decision. In such circumstances, the enforcement of the exemption 
clause would be fair. Suppliers would also be unable to rely on exemption clauses that 
exempt them from reckless conduct, as this is outlawed in terms of the CPA.  
In summary, therefore, suppliers of risky activities may include exemption clauses in their 
contracts, provided these clauses exempt them only from ordinary negligence, that they draw 
the clause(s) to the attention of consumers, and that consumers are properly warned about the 
risks which are involved in taking part in such activities. Consumers will then make a clear 
decision to continue to take part in the activity, and if something goes wrong, they will have 
agreed not to hold the supplier liable. It is submitted that there is a heavy responsibility on 
such suppliers to make sure that they adhere closely to the requirements of the CPA. Merely 
presenting a consumer with a form to sign without taking additional steps to ensure that the 
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consumer is well aware of the risks he or she is taking will not, it is submitted, be sufficient. 
However, only time will tell just how far the courts will expect suppliers to go, in order to 
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